

167 chians and Tivercians between the Dnieper and the Dniester as late as the ninth century, remarking that their settlements once extended as far as the coast of the Black Sea. These are, however, the same tribes who later took refuge in the eastern Carpathians and are the ancestors of the modern inhabitants of Subcarpathian Russia. In any case, after the elimination of the Avars, the East Slavic process of southward settlement was resumed until it was once more interrupted by the passage of the Magyars across southern Russia after the middle of the ninth century, and by subsequent inroads of the Pechenegs (Patzinaks), another wave of Turko-Tartar nomads, in the tenth century. Hence, among the earliest traditions preserved in the medieval Russian annals is that the South Russian Slavic tribes were ancient Khazar tributaries. In the early ninth century these subject tribes extended up the Dnieper as far as the river Sozh, well north of Kiev, and thus brought the whole initial extent of the subsequent principality of Kiev under Khazar tutelage.

607 The Khazars were a progressive race capable of rapid intellectual development and avid in the absorption of foreign ideas. Despite close diplomatic relations with Byzantium, they carefully sidestepped all influence toward conversion to Christianity with its political implications. Persecutions of the Jews in Byzantium during the reign of Leo III (717-740) caused a considerable Jewish migration from the Empire to the Khazar cities around the straits of Kerch. Since these Khazar centers (Kerch and Phanagoria, together with Itil, at the mouth of the Volga) were the chief transit points for Asiatic trade with the west, the Jewish settlers found abundant scope for their innate commercial talents, and rapidly came to exert a pronounced intellectual influence which culminated in the eighth century in the conversion of the Khazar ruling classes to Judaism. A remarkable feature of the Khazar polity was its religious tolerance, which guaranteed equal privileges not only to Jew and Moslem, but also to Christian refugees fleeing the rigors of the iconoclastic movement in Byzantium itself.

# 656

656 GOVERNMENT REGULATION--policies underlying government regulation of private enterprises and activities; general aspects of supervision, restriction, and enforcement; specific instances of government regulation not classifiable elsewhere; etc. See also:

|                                                                                         |     |                                                         |     |
|-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-----|---------------------------------------------------------|-----|
| Government regulation of hunting and fishing . . . . .                                  | 23  | Government regulation of radio . . . . .                | 307 |
| Government regulation of food processing . . . . .                                      | 25  | Government regulation of dairying . . . . .             | 334 |
| Government regulation of the manufacture and distribution of liquor and drugs . . . . . | 27  | Rationing . . . . .                                     | 434 |
| Government regulation of banking and finance . . . . .                                  | 45  | Price controls . . . . .                                | 435 |
| Government regulation of business and industry . . . . .                                | 47  | Government regulation of wages . . . . .                | 445 |
| Government regulation of travel and transportation . . . . .                            | 48  | Government regulation of marriage . . . . .             | 583 |
| Government regulation of immigration . . . . .                                          | 107 | Wartime regulations . . . . .                           | 733 |
| Conservation policies . . . . .                                                         | 155 | Government regulation of medical personnel . . . . .    | 759 |
|                                                                                         |     | Government regulation of weights and measures . . . . . | 804 |

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pictures of the decaying landed gentry. Goncharov composed <sup>538</sup> the classic of Russian imagination paralyzed by inertia. Tolstoi <sup>827</sup> studied the peasant problem, painted the first twenty years of the century on the magnificent canvas of his *War and Peace*, and returned to contemporary agrarian and urban problems with *Anna Karenina*. Dostoevski, after poignantly describing the bitter life of the humble in *Poor People*, acquired still deeper sympathy in his exile, and having expounded his doctrine of atonement through suffering in *Crime and Punishment*, attacked the radicals in *The Possessed*, and revealed the whole scope of his psychological penetration and the breadth of his religious philosophy in *The Brothers Karamazov*. With other authors of scarcely less merit describing contemporary life, these three decades constitute an outburst of brilliance unequalled in any world literature. Russian verse of the period was no less meritorious, and even Russian painters chose subjects which reflected the contemporary state of mind.

While the aims of political and social thinkers expanded, <sup>668</sup> the tempo of the reforms gradually slowed down with danger- <sup>175\*</sup> ous results. Active revolutionary groups had begun to take shape even in the heyday of reform, and strove for rapid democratization in the public interest. Even in the fifties, literature had ceased to be an exclusive perquisite of the aristocracy and was professionally practiced by many young men from the new middle class who were impatient at the slowness of change. Some of the young radicals made unfruitful efforts to form a community of interest with the peasantry. Others attempted to force the hand of the government by acts of violence. Marxist socialism became known in Russia during the seventies and, while it supplied the young radicals with a more aggressive program, it suggested a transfer of their missionary efforts from the peasants to the urban industrial workers who were expanding in numbers with the progressive industrialization of the country.

The rising tide of radicalism stimulated repressive measures <sup>175\*</sup> by the government, which gradually lost much of the sympathy <sup>656</sup> <sup>668</sup>

175\* which it had previously enjoyed in more moderate spheres,  
 ● 652 and even rejected loyal proposals for conservative reforms ad-  
 668 vanced in order to discourage the repeated outrages of the  
 terrorists. In 1880 the situation came to a head with an explosion in the Winter Palace itself at St. Petersburg in which the whole imperial family narrowly escaped a violent death. Alexander II then called liberal statesmen who enjoyed the public confidence to work out a series of innovations which, though not aiming at a constitution, were at least conciliatory and progressive. These reforms were viewed with apprehension by the radicals, who not only feared to lose their public but also believed (mistakenly, as it proved) that the elimination of the tsar would be the prelude to a great popular uprising. They thus assassinated Alexander II on March 13, 1881.

The results were devastating. Moderate opinion was profoundly shocked, the government relapsed into a reactionary policy which endured until 1917, only briefly interrupted by the revolution of 1905. Political freedom and even political thought were discouraged, and many conscientious liberals were reduced to disillusion and despair by the bitter conviction that progress was impossible. The situation was not helped by the economic crisis of the eighties which followed an inflationary period of hasty industrial overexpansion.

829 This disillusion is most clearly reflected in the dramas of  
 538 Chekhov, those twilight pictures of a class which vegetates without hope of change, without faith in its capacity to influence events. To this situation the accession of Nicholas II in 1894 brought no cure; since he was largely surrounded by ministers who deprecated even local self-government as only a step toward constitutionalism. But beneath the surface a new  
 175\* spirit was about to break ground. Some of the younger genera-  
 668 tion could no longer accept the resignation which Chekhov's characters practiced. For them, failure, however tragic, was not an everlasting stop-signal. Marxism gave them a program and a method. It warned them not to expect salvation from the middle class, and preached the virtues and strength of the so

871 entrances in the old imperial days. Linguistic minorities which  
 458 never even had alphabets, let alone schools, now have both. Their cultural representatives are hailed as contributors to the intellectual life of the nation, which has a chance of not remaining purely Slavic or European, but may instead draw new life and inspiration from the resident Asiatic and other alien stocks. The intermediate and elementary school system has been extended into the most remote districts, and in non-Slavic areas the native tongue has an equal chance with the official Russian.

186 The pressure of doctrine which long lay heavy on literature  
 656 and art, however, has been intensified in recent years. The trend of the times is naturally in favor of a somewhat romantic and dogmatic picture of reality, since it would not be in the interest of the prevailing system to admit that its present imperfections are permanent departures from the ideal which has been set up. Present-day Soviet culture is intensely patriotic, not to say nationalistic. But of the great legacy of the nineteenth century surprisingly little has been lost. The classics are the models for present-day writers. But upon the accomplishment of the past have been grafted the materialistic aims of a new society which aims at a degree of organization and technical achievement which even the great progressives of the sixties would not have deemed possible. For though the autocracy of the Soviet State echoes more than once the spirit of the Muscovite Middle Ages and sometimes applies the methods of the Tartars for its self-preservation, the fact still remains that this autocracy is inwardly devoted to a program of national service, the execution of which we may only hope will not be too seriously ~~hampered~~ or interrupted by international factors and power politics which divert national energy and resources from domestic growth and construction to baser military ends.

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than that of France, Germany or England. And even the Serbs and Bulgars, while they were affected by Russian influence, yet preferred to go to Western Europe in quest of models for their civilisation and institutions.

Moreover, when their political interests were at variance, the Slavs did not hesitate to make war on each other. Not until the last World War were they to be found in the same camp, during a European conflagration.

That was what gave the Soviet Union an ideal pretext for posing as the animator and leader of Slav solidarity—considered, not as an end in itself, but as the means of creating, in the Slav masses, a wave of feeling favourable to Russian imperialism.

Whilst reviving historical memories well calculated to exalt Russian patriotism, the Moscow Government organised Slav congresses, with united resistance to German oppression as their chief theme: upon the Soviet Union had devolved the role of liberator of the Slavs.

That, again, was only a diplomatic move. Panslav propaganda was the rule from 1942 to 1945. Then Moscow perceived the danger attendant on maintaining a scale of preferential treatment among the various peoples placed under Soviet influence—some of which, such as Hungary, Rumania and Eastern Germany had, in the course of their history, lived in a state of permanent hostility to the Slavs. 'Panslav' slogans disappeared from official oratory. And the 'Titoist' diversion, setting Belgrade in opposition both to Moscow and to Sofia, once more broke Slav solidarity.

[829]

With the exception of Poland, all the Slav peoples had desired greatness for Russia, but within certain limits: that of their own independence. When, from being a liberator, Russia became a dominator, the notion of Slav solidarity was purged of its political content, and the ties binding the countries of Eastern Europe to Moscow then depended entirely on Marx-Leninist unity.

• [656]

The Slav peoples saw the Russians at work in their own countries, replacing the *mystique* of emancipation by a policy of assimilation and force. The progress of 'Titoism' in Bulgaria and in Czechoslovakia is really nothing but a manifestation of the old Slav individualism, rising once more against imperialist hegemonies.

175 aggressive policy, or against any other State which might revive  
648 this policy, under any form whatsoever.

Backed both without and within by the might of Moscow, Tito's régime seemed to be irresistibly established.

Its first care had been to renew its claim to the territories of which Yugoslavia had been defrauded immediately after the First World War. It raised the question of Trieste and its hinterland. The Yugoslav delegation in London warmly defended a case supported by detailed and absolutely pertinent documentation, based on ethnographic and economic considerations. But they were imprudent enough to allow it to be understood that they would lay claim to Aegean or Hellenic Macedonia—which was bound to alienate the goodwill of Great Britain. They also mentioned the exorbitant sum which they intended to demand from Italy by way of reparations—thereby upsetting the United States, from whom Italy was at the same time seeking material aid to help her out of her desperate financial situation.

642 Yet, to tell the truth, the distrustful atmosphere which grew  
661 up around the Yugoslav claims arose more directly from the form  
175 of government and the political principles established by Tito. Under colour of anti-Fascism, the régime exercised the same reprisals against all its detractors. It was accused of borrowing the methods of the totalitarian régimes; the Opposition said that it had introduced the word 'Democracy' into the name of the State in order to dispense with it in reality, as, in the past, Pavelich gave the name of 'Independent State of Croatia' to a political offshoot of the Axis. He governed, on Russian lines, a very sensitive nation, which perhaps had not a very 'Western' notion of democracy, but had always shown itself stubbornly attached to the external forms of its independence. Certainly Tito had succeeded in grouping around him zealous young men, who had been tested under fire and were indifferent to the juridical or constitutional rites which, in the West, accompany the exercise of liberty. Certainly, too, the Yugoslav National Front represented itself not as a single party but as a synthesis of all the various energies resolved to work for the restoration of public life.

• 656 Nevertheless to Anglo-American eyes the régime appeared  
204 to be a dictatorship. Was not its slogan—'No liberty for the  
625 enemies of liberty'—calculated to justify an administration  
1 [Tito's régime -- Analyst]

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founded on despotism and personal power? The law of August 25, 1945 on the control of the press banned not only the ex-'collaborators', but also the publishers of 'alarmist' news or of news 'contrary to the general interest'—as conceived by the Government, naturally. A well-informed police organisation, modelled on Russian methods, ceaselessly exercised a very close watch over public opinion and, naturally, indulged in arbitrary arrests and acts of violence.

This policy led to dissension within the Government. The leader of the Serbian Democratic Party, Milan Grol, resigned on August 19<sup>1</sup>; on October 8<sup>1</sup> he was followed into retirement by Dr. Ivan Choubachich and the Minister Choutei, both Croat Agrarians.

Choubachich's resignation was serious, for it upset a ministerial equilibrium which had been agreed upon among the Allies. Yet what was this agreement worth, since Tito, repudiating the terms of the compromise which had sanctioned his authority, had pronounced against the monarchy? 'Not one of our combatants thought that anything new could be created under the leadership of the King, especially as the Nediches and Mihailoviches committed their crimes in his name. . . . The point is, whether the monarchy is compatible with the new system of Yugoslav Federal Democracy. . . . For several reasons, I think it is not'.

The next day (August 8, 1945) King Peter replied to this declaration by withdrawing from the Regents the power they held from him.

Tito was not intimidated by this retort. He declared that the Government acted in agreement with all the creative and constructive forces of the country, with all sincerely democratic parties. The masses of the populace had acquired, during the war, firmly-rooted political knowledge which had nothing in common with the electoral catchwords with which they previously used to be taken in.

The Opposition replied that free elections would prove the truth of this assertion, whereas those to which the country had been called were not free. The Americans and the English repeatedly emphasised the reserves they made regarding their attitude towards the régime which would result from this poll.

The elections took place on November 11<sup>1</sup>. They gave to the  
1 [1945-- Analyst]

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and responsible to it. The Assembly comprised two Chambers, the Federal Council and the Council of Nationalities; the former was elected by all the citizens, the latter appointed by the republics and autonomous districts. The Constitution established the right of referendum, compulsory military service, the separation of Church and State. Private property was recognised, up to a maximum of 25-30 hectares. But foreign trade and the greater part of the means of production, mining resources, springs, hydraulic power, woods, transport, wireless, etc. were under State control.<sup>4</sup> The Federated Republics were organised, and elected their Governments, early in 1946 (Bosnia-Herzegovina on February 15, Serbia on February 20, Slovenia on February 23; it will be noticed that the latter took the name of 'Popular Republic of the Slovenes'—obviously with the intention of serving as a magnetic centre for the Slovenes who remained under Italian or Austrian domination).

The promulgation of the new Constitution closed the first stage in post-war developments. The new Federal Government was introduced to the Legislature on February 2, 1946. Its President was Tito, who held the portfolio of National Defence, assisted by two Vice-Presidents, one Communist, the Slovene Edward Kardelj, a militant member of the Slovene Workers' Associations and principal instigator of the Constitution, and one Republican, the Serb, Jasa Prodanovich. Foreign Affairs were entrusted to Stanoje Simich. Kardelj was President of the Federal Control Commission, an all-powerful organism which supervised the acts of the Ministers and of the President himself. The spokesman of the Communist Party was Milovan Djilas, who was responsible for the Youth Movement. The President of the Presidium was a Croat, Ivan Ribar, a former Deputy of the Serbo-Croat Coalition, President of the Constituent of 1921 and one of the authors of the so-called Constitution of Vidovdan. After having joined the Democratic Party, he left it at the time of the dictatorship of King Alexander. Under the occupation he did liaison work between the Republicans and the

<sup>4</sup> The arms of the Federal State represent a field, between two sheaves of corn, connected by a ribbon inscribed: '22nd November, 1943'. Between the tips of the ears of corn is a five-pointed star; in the middle of the field five torches, bending over, converge into a single flame. The federal flag is red, white and blue (with the red at the bottom), and has a red star in the middle.

## PANSLAVISM

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fessor P. N. Sakulin<sup>6</sup> "to the conservation of serfdom and of 186\*  
 forms of life tied with it. Besides, Uvarov realized very well this 829  
 spiritual relationship between serfdom and absolutism, and he de-  
 finitely expressed the view that autocracy and serfdom, having  
 the same historical source, must have the same historical fate."  
 When the Chaadaev scandal exploded, Count Benckendorff, head  
 of the Russian police and the closest collaborator of Nicholas I,  
 expressed the following opinion: "*Le passé de la Russie a été ad-  
 mirable; son présent est plus que magnifique; quant à son avenir  
 il est au delà de tout ce que l'imagination la plus hardie se peut  
 figurer.*"<sup>7</sup>

The establishment of this ideology was not confined merely to [656]●  
 official interviews, proclamations, and manifestos. The govern-  
 ment had in its hands powerful means with which to imprison the  
 thought of the country within its official ideology. The most effi-  
 cient weapon was censorship and interdiction of foreign travel.  
 The aim was not only to impose respect for the "three whales"  
 of that ideology but also to eliminate any disaggregating Western  
 influence. I need not mention the fact that in the eyes of the rep-  
 resentatives of the *ofitsial'naya narodnost'* the West was con-  
 sidered a source of all kinds of mischievous and dangerous ideas.  
 Strong echos of slogans launched by the official ideology often 186\*  
 resounded in the writings of people who from a certain point of 829  
 view might be considered independent. The most striking exam- 538  
 ple is to be found in the works of a man who, by the way, was one  
 of the closest friends of the Russian Slavophiles—I have in mind  
 Nicholas Gogol.

One remembers certainly Chichikov's troika "flying like a whirl-  
 wind" on the last pages of the first volume of *Dead Souls*, and  
 one recalls perhaps that the writer compares that troika to a Rus-  
 sia "flying onwards like a spirited troika that nothing can over-  
 take." "The road is smoking under thee," writes Gogol. "The  
 bridges rumble, everything falls back and is left behind. . . .

<sup>6</sup> *Istoriya Rossii v XIX Vek, Ind. A. I. Granata, vol. II, p. 445.*

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 445.

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186\* ings, manifestations, and commemorations in America; in June 1942 such meetings and congresses took place in New York, in 668 Pittsburgh, in Detroit, in Kansas, in Cleveland, in San Francisco, 575 in Oakland, and also in Canada, Argentina, etc., organized by local Slavic committees. These organizations in America and in other countries represent ramifications of the Moscow center; and at each meeting they manifested this relationship by sending addresses and telegrams not only to the Panslavic committee in Moscow but to Stalin, Kalinin, Molotov, and so on. Around the Muscovite center were organized during the war all kinds of Slavic national committees and unions of patriots at the head of which one could find the members of the Panslavic committee in Moscow. These committees and unions were nuclei from which originated the "democratic governments" imposed by Russia to the Slavic and non-Slavic countries (similar committees were organized for Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria) which found themselves in the sphere of Russia's influence.

[208] For the task of propaganda of these Panslavic ideas of union and fraternity of the Slavs under the protection of Soviet Russia and under her cultural leadership there has been established a monthly review under the title *The Slavs*, published in Moscow in Russian.

186\* It is paradoxical enough that if one takes different Soviet encyclopedias one may find a radical refutation of Panslavic conceptions; the Panslavism of the 19th century has been always 829 qualified there as a bourgeois imperialistic doctrine. It would 656 be very difficult, however, to find any salient difference between the Panslavistic imperialistic conceptions of Tsarist Russia, as far as their essence is concerned, and the Panslavistic policy of the Soviets, even though their motives and ultimate goals are not identical. In order to save appearances the official Soviet press still stresses that difference; so N. Leonidov in his articles *The New Phase in Slav History* published in *New Times* in Moscow in September, 1946, said: "The Russian people never identified themselves with the imperialistic chauvinistic Panslavism of the

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186\* "monarchists." "The slanderous talk about new Panslavism is part of an anti-Soviet campaign."<sup>96</sup>

829 Of course there are differences. The Russian tsarist government used to change from time to time its attitude toward the doctrines of the Muscovite Slavophiles and those of the Panslavists. All depended on the international situation. Besides, in spite of its Machiavellian policy the tsarist government was still bound by precepts of international and public law as well as by international public opinion, and because of that its Russianizing methods and proceedings were still in a certain degree moderated. Therefore in some cases there appeared a divergence of views between the representatives of the government and the most chauvinistic, aggressive representatives of Russian Panslavism as, for instances, the famous apologist of the Russification of Poland—Katkov. Anyhow the Slavophiles and Panslavists at that time represented a free, independent initiative. From time to time they even found themselves under a governmental observation that was not very benevolent to them, especially when their Panslavic enthusiasm was bringing harm to the Russian government in its relation with neighboring countries.

186\* It is obvious that the present situation from this point of view is completely different. Everyone knows that there is no room and no possibility for any individual free political initiative under the rule of the *Politburo*. The whole present Panslavic movement has been organized by the Soviet government, and people who are taking part in it are agents of that government. In the beginning the aim was to organize Slavic elements for the fight against Fascism and Hitlerism, against Germany; the unspeakable German atrocities greatly encouraged these activities. Such is the aspect of the first years of the publication *The Slavs*. We find there articles dealing mostly with war events, with German crimes, or with the military history of Russia, articles glorifying great Russian generals like Kutuzov, Suvorov, great Russian tsars or princes like Alexander Nevsky, Peter the Great, some articles

<sup>96</sup> Quoted from "Degeneration of Panslavism" by George C. Guins. The article has not yet appeared, but the author has kindly permitted me to use it.

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 • 666 glorifying the outstanding Soviet generals and, of course, men like Molotov, Lenin, "the great son of Slavdom"; and Stalin, "son of the nations of Russia"—it would be rather difficult to make of him a Slav. There are also articles about different manifestations of old and modern Slavic culture, biographies of great Slavs, predominantly Russian. Copernicus, one of them, had a rather amusing fate under the pen of Soviet clerks writing under the *Politburo's* dictates. The *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* (1926) calls Copernicus the "greatest Polish scholar"; and later, its *Great* brother leaves the reader with the impression that he was a German Scholar. Finally, the review *The Slavs* emphasizes his Polish patriotism and the prestige of the University of Cracow!

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 668 The activities concerning the further organization of Panslavic meetings abroad have not been abandoned. On the contrary, recently at the end of 1946 there again took place such meetings in America and in Belgrade with the predominant role played by official and unofficial agents and delegates of Soviet Russia, ending with telegrams and addresses expressing loyalty to Soviet Russia, sent to Stalin, Kalinin, and Molotov. All these facts must lead one to the conclusion that we are witnessing here the organization of a new International, of a Slavic International, parallel to the Comintern, and that the numerous ramifications of this organization outside of Russia represent nuclei of a Slavic fifth column in the countries which are outside of the immediate zone of Soviet influence. Within this zone Russia is much less interested in the development of the Panslavic movement through any special organizations, as she has there at her complete disposal the governments of the countries which are under Russian political domination. I do not have to stress what I mentioned before—that Stalin has in his hands means of Russification about which Goldmann and Katkov could only dream.

Not without interest is the fact that the Inter-Slav Bureau of Foreign Contacts had during the war six sections—for the United States, Canada, Central and South America, Australia and New Zealand, the Near and Middle East, and Great Britain. A seventh

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section dealt with the "occupied countries" and came partly under the jurisdiction of the Bureau and partly under that of the Committee for Active Struggle Against Fascism. In 1942 the All-Slav Committee's budget amounted to 320,000,000 roubles, in 1943 to 400 million, and in 1944, when the financial division had ceased to come under the control of the Secretariate, the Committee's budget had risen to 550 million roubles. The All-Slav Congress which took place recently in Belgrade has afforded some indications of the place which the All-Slav Committee holds in Russia's post-war political propaganda apparatus. The main speech of the Soviet delegate, General Gundorov, was an invitation to the Slav peoples to ignore "the sinister forces of world reaction" and submit to Communist guidance. Two resolutions [656] passed by the Belgrade Congress deserve attention. The first, which makes Belgrade the center of the All-Slav Committee and Maslavitch its chairman, is an indication of the importance attached in Soviet policy to Slav sentiment in the Balkans, where to some extent it is a substitute for nationalist sentiment. The second resolution provides for the participation in the work of the All-Slav Committee of representatives of "the largest progressive Slav organization from non-Slav countries, with the right to an advisory vote."

In order not to be misunderstood I feel it necessary to stress that in spite of some striking parallelisms in the use of Panslavic conceptions by Soviet foreign policy and by the Russian tsarist government, the differences remain enormous—but not at all in the sense of Mr. Leonidov's views. As I mentioned before, the Russian tsarist government of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries was bound by international and public law; and because of this the fate of the Russian subject of those times cannot be compared to the fate of the modern Russian citizen. Russia was not hidden behind an iron curtain from the world, and foreign travelers could visit Russia and freely observe her life. Poles, Ukrainians, Lithuanians, and Russians were sent to Siberia, but tsarist Russia did not know concentration camps; and the conditions of